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Introduction
1 The concept of digital  heritage denotes a new form of legacy in the changing digital
environment.  This  rather  abstract  term  originates  from  the  UNESCO  Charter  on  the
Preservation  of  Digital  Heritage  (2003), aiming  at  conserving  and  protecting  digital
equivalents of “the world’s heritage of books, works of art and monuments of history and
science” (UNESCO, Preamble; Cf. Sheppard, 2012: 2). In terms of content, it comprises
both  digitized  and  “born  digital”1 materials  of  enduring  value,  such  as  cultural,
educational, scientific and administrative resources as well as technical, legal, medical or
other kinds of  information,  whose public accessibility should be preserved for future
generations2.  Thereby, the charter seeks to keep a fair balance between the creator’s
rights and the interest of the public to access these resources3.
2 Heritage institutions, such as public libraries, archives or museums – but also private
undertakings  –  fulfil  a  predominant  role  with  regard  to  the  acquisition,  storage,
dissemination and use of information and knowledge (Fischman Afori, 2013: 392 et seq.);
these intermediaries provide public access to cultural and scientific content which forms
a vital basis for the information society and serves as a catalyst for academic research and
economy.4
3 Against the background of the ongoing digital evolution and the related increase of data,
there is a growing conviction on the national as well as international level that digital
preservation  strategies  for  analogue  and  electronic  resources  have  to  be  actively
elaborated5. Thus, memory institutions participating in these processes do not only guard
analogue  collections,  but  also  become  involved  in  the  creation  of  new  digital
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environments serving as a gateway to information and services in the digital  society
(Purday, 2010: 176.).
4 However, digital heritagization is not only a relevant societal phenomenon, but it also
gains significance in terms of intellectual property law. Since the digitization of analogue
resources  and  the  processing  of  born  digital  content  presuppose  inter  alia  the
reproduction and duplication of the content in question, the field of copyright law is of
particular interest.  Thereby,  the discussion on the national  and international  level  is
characterized by the heterogeneous and partly restrictive legal framework. On the one
hand, this fact inevitably raises general questions with regard to the rights holder as well
as the extent and transfer of rights. On the other hand, specific issues such as orphan
works, change of format, digitization of whole collections or Digital Rights Management
schemes have to be considered in this context. In addition the issue has been raised as to
whether the law keeps pace with recent technological developments. This contribution
takes the given situation as an impetus to shed light on the legal implications of digital
heritagization, considering the theoretical legal framework as well as selected national
and international judgments rendered in civil and common law jurisdictions.
 
Digital Heritagization: a multi-stakeholder process
5 Digital heritagization as a compound term refers to the processes through which heritage is
created in digital environments by means of ICT6. These processes encompass both “born
digital”  content  directly  generated  by  means  of  ICT  devices  and  digitized  analogue
resources, the particular focus of this article.
6 Various  heritage  institutions  initiated  mass-scale  digitization  projects  aiming  at
preserving  valuable  and  significant  analogue  resources  in  digital  format7.  In  the
meantime,  there  are  national  as  well  as  international  efforts  seeking  to  create
comprehensive digital collections based on the model of the famous Alexandrian Library
(Fischman Afori, 2013: 397). The most prominent example, concerning the field of literary
heritage,  is  the  European Union’s  Europeana project  (Fischman Afori,  2013:  397),  but
besides it,  notable initiatives are also taken at the national level, e.g. in Switzerland8,
seeking to  safeguard valuable  information by  means  of  digital  technology (Fischman
Afori, 2013: 397). The Europeana project’s focus is, on the one hand, on old and valuable
works,  such  as  antiquarian  books  or  rare  handwritings,  whose  accessibility  would
otherwise be limited, and, on the other hand, on highly frequented contemporary works,
such as scientific literature or journals, that are made available to the public in order to
contribute to educational  or scientific purposes.  However,  the digitization and public
dissemination of these works is not governed by a direct contractual relationship
between the heritage institutions disposing of the content and the rights holder legally
entitled to the work (Fischman Afori, 2013: 393).
7 Furthermore,  private  undertakings  fulfil  a  considerable  role  for  purposes  of  digital
heritagization.  In this context,  particular reference has to be made to the mass-scale
digitization initiated by Google in cooperation with American libraries, commonly known
as  “Google  Books”,  in  the course  of  which millions  of  books  were digitized and made
available online. This comprehensive searchable literature database provides full access
to content in the public domain, in contrast to copyrighted works being only partially
retrievable (Häyrinen, 2012: 59; Fischman Afori, 2013: 397)9.
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8 Conceptually, the previously mentioned resources have to be distinguished from “born
digital”  resources.  Recent literary works and scientific  articles,  in particular,  may be
published in analogue as well as in digital form, or even exclusively in digital form. Since
contemporary  content  is  and  will  be  primarily  produced  in  digital  form,  this  area
deserves closer attention in the future. In this regard, the developments in the field of e-
government and the increasing digitization of “grey literature”, such as official reports,
policy statements or legislative documents which were previously difficult to access, are
also worth mentioning and raise questions in terms of preservation.
9 Regarding  “born  digital  heritage”,  its  accessibility  is  generally  subject  to  a  contract
through  which  the  rights  holder  confers  an  online  license  to  the  providing  public
memory institution (Fischman Afori, 2013: 393). It should be pointed out, however, that
this is not always the case: the Portuguese Web archive, for example, proceeds to the act
of archiving with no prior third-party request, but withdraws content upon request or if
it poses legal challenges (e.g., paedophile content)10. 
10 More broadly, and perhaps more prominently due to its global reach, online archiving
projects with a global focus, e.g. Internet Archive, became key players for purposes of
digital heritagization and aim to preserve content such as web sites, software, movies,
music and other types of information on a long term basis, with the purpose of providing
free access to these resources for interested researchers as well as other users.11 
11 In order to avoid “digital black holes”, i.e. digitized or born digital information contained
in  digital  environments  that  are  no  longer  maintained  or  technically  not  accessible
anymore,  due to obsolete formats or technology,  steps are also taken to make these
contents a part of our collective memory, such as Twitter feeds or even whole websites,
retrievable  for  future  generations.12 However,  the  question  of  the  preservation  and
accessibility of the abovementioned born digital or digitized content is twofold: on the
one hand, the content itself has to be digitally preserved in order to remain accessible; on
the other hand, the access itself, i.e. the underlying hardware and software have to be
secured,  because  the  stored  data  cannot  be  decrypted  without  the  corresponding
technological device. Archaic formats like the floppy disk, audio tapes and CDs already




12 The  abovementioned  processes  of  digital  heritagization  entail  a  challenging
interdisciplinary discourse, involving social, political, and economic dimensions as well as
the technical issues of implementation. However, the legal aspects often prove to be the
key topics for the discussion. The legal implications of digital heritagization, particularly
the admissibility of copying and distributing content, are located in the field of copyright
law. In order to comprehensively approach the relevant legal sources, national as well as
international  legislations  have  to  be  taken into  account  constituting  a  multi-layered
framework.
13 On  the  international  level,  general  principles  have  been  incorporated  by  the  WTO
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the WIPO Copyright Treaty. Furthermore,
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supranational  EU legislation harmonizing selected legal  aspects has to be considered;
thereby, the Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive) constitutes the most influential piece
of  secondary  legislation  in  the  digital  context  (Kuhlen,  2013:  2;  Gowers,  2006:  32;
European Commission, 2008: 5). Since the genuine legislative competence remained at
State level (Kuhlen, 2013: 1), the national transposing legislation in conjunction with the
complementary national provisions has also to be considered.
14 In order to protect the intellectual work of individuals, copyright law confers certain
exclusive rights to the author, of which he can dispose within the limits set by law. Thus,
it is for him to decide about the direct as well as derivative use of his intellectual creation,
such as the right of reproduction, publication or distribution (Dnes, 2013: 420; Kuhlen,
2013: 2). However, as an expression of a fair and careful balance between public interests
and  private  proprietary  rights,  the  latter  can  be  limited  under  certain  conditions
(Fischman Afori, 2013: 401; Müller & Oertli, 2006: Art. 19 N 4; Kuhlen, 2013: 3). Depending
on the “legal family”13, the limitations, enabling certain persons or institutions to make
use of protected works, are differently conceived (Müller & Oertli, 2006: Art. 19 N 20).
15 In  this  regard,  the  so  called  “three-step  test”14 incorporated  in  Art.  9(2)  Berne
Convention, Art.  13 TRIPs, and Art.  10 WCT imposes an internationally acknowledged
minimal standard according to which (1) the exceptions should be constrained to certain
special cases, (2) they should not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work, and
(3) they should not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author or rights
holder (Kuhlen, 2013: 13 et seq.; Fischman Afori, 2013: 401)15. As a consequence of this
broad  formulation,  the  approaches  of  the  legal  families  towards  limitations  may
significantly differ.
16 While the continental European legal families, including inter alia Switzerland as part of
the  Germanic  legal  tradition,  refer  to  codified  legal  exemptions  that  enumerate
admissible forms of free use, the common law systems adhere to the doctrine of “fair use”
or “fair dealing” (Müller & Oertli, 2006: Art. 19 N 20 et seq.). On the basis of (semi)open
norms providing general  guidelines  for  their  application (Fischman Afori,  2013:  401),
certain forms of use of copyrighted materials can become judicially admissible without
obtaining previous permission of the rights holder (Häyrinen, 2012: 60). However, from a
conceptual  point  of  view these  limitations  of  authors’  rights  rather  resemble  ex-post
defenses to copyright infringement actions than ex-ante legal exceptions (Dnes, 2013: 423
et seq., 431). 
17 The assessment of fair use regarding copyrighted content is primarily based on four non-
exclusive factors laid down in 17 U.S.C. § 107, but courts may also consider additional
elements (Dnes, 2013: 432), indicating a conceptual proximity to the principle of equity
(Dnes,  2013:  424).  Due  to  its  reference  to  certain  prescribed  purposes,  the  scope  of
application of  the fair  dealings doctrine contained in the UK Copyright,  Designs and
Patents Act 1988 is narrowed down and thereby approximates the legal exceptions of the
continental legal orders, which is to a certain degree attributable to the influence of EU
case law and secondary legislation (Dnes, 2013: 423 et seq.). However, both approaches
constitute flexible solutions and may easily adapt to new technological  developments
(Dnes, 2013: 419).
18 With  regard  to  limitations  of  author’s  rights,  the  continental  civil  law  systems  are
strongly  influenced  by  the  mentioned  InfoSoc  Directive.  Its  second  chapter  imposes
maximum harmonization measures and provides both exhaustive mandatory exceptions
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(Art.  5[1])  and  optional  limitations  (Art.  5[2]-[4])  (Foundation  for  Information  Policy
Research, 2003: 14 et seq). Besides the exceptions that have to be transposed, national
legislators are free to decide which implementations they undertake, but they may not
introduce  additional  exceptions.  However,  copyright  law in  Europe  still  significantly
differs  among countries  and rather constitutes  a  patchwork of  national  rules  than a
harmonized  field  of  law (European Commission,  2008:  5).  Equally,  the  approach  and
implementation of exceptions to authors’ rights deviates depending on the legal order
and already became subject to court proceedings.
 
Legal challenges
19 In light of the complex legal framework mentioned above, heritage institutions involved
in the process of digital heritagization and related mass-scale digitization projects are
confronted  with  different  problems  in  terms  of  copyright  law.  Two  issues  are  of
particular interest in this regard: on the one hand, the legal appreciation of digital copies
of analogue works and, on the other hand, the admissibility of the online deployment of
the digitized content and related services.
20 As an expression of the exclusive rights conferred by copyright law, in general it is for the
rights holder to authorize any form of reproduction as well as any communication of its
work to the public according to Art. 2, 3 InfoSoc Directive.16 As stated, there are limited
exceptions to these rights granted to public heritage institutions, such as in Art. 5(2)(c),
(3)(n) InfoSoc Directive, allowing certain forms of use of the copyrighted works.17 In view
of the wording adopted, several issues remain, however, undetermined. Hence, it is still
questionable whether, and if yes how many, digital copies, requiring a change of format
and eventually affecting the author’s exclusive rights, may be created.18 Moreover, it has
to be assessed as to whether whole works or even whole collections may be digitized.19
21 In terms of content, heritage institutions are concerned with different kinds of works.
Besides the previously mentioned legal problems related to copyrighted works,  mass-
scale digitization projects also involve public domain material or content that is no longer
published  (so  called  out-of-print  works)20,  but  in  particular  orphan  works  (Art.  2(1)
Orphan Works Directive). There is a high percentage of cultural and scientific resources
contained  in  the  collections  of  memory  institutions  whose  right  holders  cannot  be
identified or located; due to the term of copyright protection, serious impediments for
digitization  projects  might  accrue  since  the  owner’s  consent  is  difficult  or  even
impossible to obtain (Fischman Afori, 2013: 396).
22 Apart  from  the  previously  mentioned  analogue  works  which  are  not  subject  to  a
contractual  relationship between rights  holder  and source provider,  the discourse of
digital  heritagization also involves born digital  content regularly subject  to a license
agreement. Public institutions, such as libraries or archives, that would like to make use
of the respective electronic resources, e.g. e-books or e-journals, have to comply with the
license terms that however tend to exceed the exclusive rights conferred by copyright
law at the expense of heritage institutions and end users, respectively (Fischman Afori,
2013: 393, 395). If works are published in analogue and (subsequently) in digital form, the
legal  implications  remain  undetermined  to  a  certain  extent  and  frictions  are  not
inconceivable.
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Case law
23 Recently,  the  prescribed uncertainties  of  digital  heritagization processes  in  terms  of
copyright law became subject  to proceedings before national  as well  as international
courts. Subsequently, some of the important judgments rendered by the European Court
of Justice (ECJ), the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) and the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.) with regard to digitization processes and
related issues will be discussed and analyzed, taking into account a comparative legal
perspective in order to point out the deviating approaches of the two main legal families.
 
ECJ Case-117/13 Technische Universität Darmstadt v Eugen Ulmer KG
24 The case decided by the ECJ in the course of a preliminary ruling procedure involved
different aspects of interest for purposes of digital heritagization. At the origin of the
proceedings is an action filed before the German Federal Supreme Court by Eugen Ulmer
KG21 against Technische Universität Darmstadt,  which maintains a public library with
electronic  workstations  allowing  to  digitally  access  specific  books  contained  in  its
collection. The subject of the dispute was the digitization of a copyrighted scientific book
which the  TU Darmstadt  made publicly  available  through these  dedicated terminals.
Thus, the library users were able to read and print out the book or acquire a digital copy.
The publisher’s offer to provide the copyrighted resource as e-book, subject to a license
agreement, was refused by TU Darmstadt.22
25 The case involved the application of § 52b German Copyright Act (GCA), constituting the
national  transposition  of  Art.  5(3)(n)  InfoSoc  Directive,  and  thus  required  the
interpretation of EU law. Accordingly, the German Federal Supreme Court suspended its
proceedings and referred three preliminary questions to the ECJ: 1) Does the limitation of
§ 52b GCA also apply if the work in question is available in digital form and offered to the
library for utilization subject to a license agreement; 2) is the library allowed to digitize a
work in its collection in order to make it accessible to the public by means of dedicated
terminals, and 3) are the users entitled to print out these works or save them on a USB-
stick?23
26 In its deliberations, the ECJ mainly followed the opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen
and declared the digitization of works admissible without prior consent of the rights
holder, if necessary to provide access to the public by dedicated terminals. Even though,
Art.  5(3)(n)  InfoSoc  Directive  would  primarily  relate  to  the  exclusive  right  of
communication pursuant to Art. 3 InfoSoc Directive 24, the ECJ acknowledged an ancillary
right of reproduction in this regard and declared the accompanying digitization of the
works  admissible,  because  the  “right”  of  these  establishments,  derived  from  the
limitation, could be otherwise rendered meaningless or ineffective.25 However, since this
right would only comprise “specific acts of reproduction” pursuant to Art. 5(2)(c) InfoSoc
Directive26, the substantial scope of the limitation would encompass the digitization of
certain,  single  works,  but  not  whole  collections.27 This  assessment  would  also  be  in
compliance with the conditions set by the “three-step test” in Art. 5(5) InfoSoc Directive.
28 Against the background of the first preliminary question29, the Court further specified,
that the exception of Art. 5(3)(n) InfoSoc Directive would even remain applicable in case
that an electronic version of the book is offered to the library in accordance with the
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publisher’s license terms, since the reservation “purchase or licensing terms” would refer
to contractual terms actually agreed, but not to unilateral contractual offers.30
27 The  subsequent  and  more  interesting  question31,  as  to  whether  copyright  protected
content made accessible by electronic workstations in the library may be printed out or
saved on a USB stick was, however, denied by the judges in Luxembourg. The creation of
analogue and digital copies does not affect the right of communication, but constitutes
supplementary acts of reproduction outside the scope of Art. 5(3)(n) InfoSoc Directive.32
But, according to the ECJ, paper printouts could be comprised by the exceptions of Art. 5
(2)(a,b) InfoSoc Directive33; thereby, the extent of copies may not violate the interest of
the right holder.34
28 The ECJ was asked to interpret the InfoSoc Directive, which aims at harmonizing certain
aspects of copyright law in the information society,  but remained unable to adapt to
recent technological challenges in the digital context.35 Under European law, heritage
institutions may digitize copyrighted content, because Art. 5(3)(n) in conjunction with
Art.  5(2)(c) InfoSoc Directive confers to them an “ancillary right” of digitization with
regard to old, valuable resources or highly frequented content.36 Thereby, the scope of
this right has been further extended to the detriment of publishers (Peifer, 2015: 365446),
since the digitization of  analogue resources,  equally  available  in digital  format,  is  in
compliance with the exception as long as no licensing agreement on the use of the e-
resource has been concluded. This is of particular interest with regard to the collections
of public heritage institutions, which are composed of analogue and digital resources.
29 Nonetheless, the impact of the ECJ’s judgment should not be overestimated and various
questions remained unanswered. First of all, the Directive’s personal scope of application
is constrained to public institutions and thus the legal appreciation of private digitization
initiatives remains unsettled. Secondly, in contrast to the approach of Advocate General
Jääskinen who derived the ancillary right of reproduction alternatively from Art. 5(3)(n)
or Art. 5(2)(c) InfoSoc Directive37, the ECJ read both provisions in conjunction with each
other. As a result, digitization processes are in compliance with EU law, however, since
the transposition of the exceptions in Art. 5(2) and (3) InfoSoc Directive lies within the
discretion of each Member State and EU directives are in general not directly applicable,
each  national  implementation  has  to  be  consulted.  In  the  case  of  Germany,  the
digitization  is  not  in  compliance  with  copyright  law,  because  §  52b  GCA  does  not
implement Art.  5(2)(c)  InfoSoc Directive and the resulting lacuna cannot be filled by
means of interpretation (Wiebe & Müller, 2015: 742; Jani, 2014: 872). Thirdly, the Court
held that only certain works of a collection may be digitized and thus the permissibility of
mass-scale digitization projects remains questionable in the light of Art. 5(5) and Art. 5(2)
(c) InfoSoc Directive. However, since the judgment does not quantify the condition of
specificity, the extent to which a collection may be digitized remains unclear. In terms of
digital  heritagization, the quantitative restrictions raise questions according to which
criteria the content to be digitized should be selected. Should only the oldest and most
valuable resources or the most frequented books be digitized, excluding cultural diversity
in the sense of “small is beautiful”?38 Equally, the admissibility of paper printouts has
only been superficially analyzed and it remains open as to whether only excerpts or even
whole books may be reproduced.39
30 Meanwhile,  following the preliminary ruling procedure,  the German Federal Supreme
Court delivered its final judgment40, which appears to deviate from the ECJ’s findings with
regard to subsequent acts of reproduction, such as paper print outs or digital copies on
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usb sticks, and provoked sharp criticism e.g. from the German Publishers and Booksellers
Association.41
 
Swiss Federal Tribunal judgment 4A_295/2014
31 The SFT has recently decided on a related case that was initiated by three scientific
publishers – Elsevier, Springer and Thieme – against the Federal Technical University
Zurich.  The  latter  maintained  a  document  delivery  service  in  the  course  of  which
excerpts of analogue resources within its collection were scanned and provided to the
library user  by means of  analogue or digital  copies.42 Following the judgment of  the
Commercial  Court  of  the  Canton Zurich,  that  considered the  university’s  services  as
inadmissible, because they would not fulfill the notion of “personal use” pursuant to Art.
19 CopA and thus violate the claimants’  rights43,  the SFT approved the appeal of  the
university.
32 According to Swiss law, the creation of analogue and digital copies equally affects the
author’s  rights  granted  by  Art.  10  CopA.44 However,  comparable  to  other  civil  law
systems,  the  legal  exception  embedded  in  Art.  19  CopA  allows  certain  people  or
institutions to make use of copyright protected content without prior consent.
33 The  SFT  was  asked  to  construe  and  delineate  the  different  forms  of  “personal  use”
contained in the provision and thereby clarified the exception’s scope of application. In
this  case,  it  was  contested  whether  the  prohibition  to  completely  reproduce  works
commercially available according to Art. 19(3)(a) CopA also applies if a third party has
been mandated by a private individual entitled to make “personal use” of the copyrighted
content.45 According to the SFT, the complete reproduction of “works” is solely permitted
to private individuals themselves pursuant to Art. 19(1)(a) CopA46, whereas other persons
and public institutions enumerated in Art.  19(1)(b,c)  CopA may neither perform such
processes for themselves nor on behalf of private individuals pursuant to Art. 19(2) CopA.
47 In line with its previous case law48, the SFT held that reproduction processes may take
place in analogue as well as digital form.49
34 With regard to the central point of interest (Bieler, 2015: 162), the SFT, in contrast to the
deliberations  of  the  court  of  first  instance50,  interpreted  Art.  19(3)(a)  CopA,  which
prohibits the complete reproduction of “works”51, as referring to the journal or anthology
that served as actual copy template, but not to the single article contained therein, which
might also be separately available over an online archive.52 The Court ruled in favor of the
public’s information interest and stated that it would be for the publishers to adapt to the
changed needs of the public and to offer scientific articles only in individual format in
order to exclude their extensive reproduction in accordance with Art. 19(3)(a) CopA.53
Whether the Court’s perception is in accordance with the legislator’s intention might be
questionable.54 Moreover, the highest Swiss Court emphasized that public libraries may
only produce analogue or digital excerpts on demand, but not on stock, and therefore
prohibited the maintenance of a respective online archive.55
35 If, however, a private individual mandates a third person pursuant to Art. 19(2) CopA to
produce a (legally permissible) partial reproduction of such a work56, the process does not
only comprise the creation of analogue or digital copies of resources within the library’s
collection,  but  may also involve their  subsequent delivery by post  or email.57 In this
regard,  the  SFT  confirmed  that  the  document  delivery  service  maintained  by  the
university is in line with Art. 19(2) CopA and does not constitute a relevant form of use in
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terms of copyright law according to Art. 10(1)(b,c) CopA.58 A deviating opinion of the
Swiss legislator due to the emergence of digital technology could not be ascertained.59
36 The SFT’s judgment provides valuable insights for purposes of digital heritagization. In
line with the Court’s comprehensive technology-neutral conception of the Swiss CopA60,
digitization processes are considered as being in compliance with the legal exception of
Art. 19 CopA. The complete reproduction of analogue, commercially available works is,
however,  limited  to  private  individuals;  public  heritage  institutions  may  neither
completely copy such resources in their own interest, e.g. for preservation purposes, nor
those of third parties.
37 Besides that, the Court substantiated the notion of “work” underlying the prohibition of
Art.  19(3)(a) CopA and thus further clarified the provision’s scope of application. The
quantification in case that the resource in question is not divided into single articles
remains, however, open. Furthermore, the Court declared partial reproductions, e.g. of
highly frequented works, on behalf of private individuals admissible and such excerpts
may also  be  provided in  analogue or  digital  form by means  of  a  document  delivery
service.  Aiming at  fostering the information interest  of  society  and science,  the SFT
construed  the  Swiss  CopA  and  its  legal  exceptions  in  the  light  of  the  ongoing
technological developments and enabled users to make comprehensive use of new digital
technologies (Bieler, 2015: 163 et seq). Since the SFT, however, excluded the preventive
creation and storage of digital copies by public heritage institutions in order to maintain
an online archive, the judgment can be considered as a damper on public mass-scale
digitization  projects.  Though  the  restriction  imposed  by  the  judges  involves  “only”
copyright protected content, public collections often comprise orphan works and thus
public  mass-scale  digitization  projects  and  other  online  services  will  not  be  feasible
unless they refer to content in the public domain or with regard to which an online
license has been acquired.
 
The Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y.)
38 The case before the S.D.N.Y. involved the private mass-digitization project initiated by
Google in cooperation with public and private American libraries, comprising both in-
print and out-of-print resources.61 The initiators thereby digitally reproduced and stored
millions of books by means of digital copies on their servers aiming to make those works
publicly  available.62 While  public  domain  content  became  completely  retrievable,
copyright protected books were provided only to a limited extent in form of “snippets”.63
In the course of the subsequent dispute between the Authors Guild,  representing the
interest  of  published  authors,  and  Google,  a  settlement  agreement  was  primarily
negotiated, which was, however, not judicially confirmed.64 Following this, the Authors
Guild issued a claim of copyright infringement against Google which relied on the defense
of fair use according to 17 U.S.C. § 107.65 In the light of the doctrine’s general aim to
“fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’”66
and by reference to the four factors laid down in 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4), the S.D.N.Y. was
asked to analyze as to whether the actions performed by Google fall within the scope of
fair use under copyright law (Xalabarder, 2014: 55).
39 With regard to the first factor, namely the purpose and character of the use67, the Court
considered  the  use  of  copyrighted  resources  by  Google  Books  to  be  “highly
transformative”.68 First of all, the digitization of analogue text and its subsequent display
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by means of snippets would facilitate searching and finding books.69 Furthermore, the
transformation of analogue text into digital data would support new forms of research,
such as data mining and text mining.70 Accordingly, Google uses words for a different
purpose or in a way they have not been used before and thus “adds value to the original”.
71 Even though the use in a commercial way “tends to weigh against the finding of fair
use”72 and Google obviously gained, at least indirectly, commercial benefits, this finding
was outweighed, on the one hand, by the fact that Google was not engaged in the direct
commercialization of the works by selling the digital scans or snippets and, on the other
hand, by the public interest in the project.73
40 The consideration with regard to the second factor, namely the nature of the copyrighted
works74, further fostered a finding of fair use, since the project predominantly involved
non-fictional books available to the public75, which are less protected in terms of fair use
than works of fictional nature (Xalabarder, 2014: 55). The picture slightly changed when
the third factor was taken into account, which involved the amount and substantiality of
portion used.76 The Court held that copying the entirety of a work may still be fair use,
but since the full-work reproduction is critical to the functioning of Google Books and
only snippets were displayed, the third factor rather tends against a finding of fair use.77
41 With regard to the fourth factor relating to the effect of use upon potential market or
value78,  the Court clearly rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments according to which Google
Books would serve as a “market replacement” for books and would allow to access entire
books.79 In contrast, the S.D.N.Y. considered the project as enhancing the sale of books to
the benefits of copyright holders, because the works in question could be easily found,
and thus strongly favored fair use in this regard. 80
42 Weighing the four non-exhaustive factors in the course of an overall  assessment, the
Court ruled in favor of Google and dismissed the case on grounds of fair use (Xalabarder,
2014: 54). In the Court’s opinion, “Google Books provides significant public benefits. It
advances  the  progress  of  the  arts  and  sciences,  while  maintaining  respectful
consideration  for  the  rights  of  authors  and  other  creative  individuals,  and  without
adversely impacting the rights of copyright holders”.81 It does not only preserve out-of-
print as well as old books and facilitates accessing such resources, but also creates new
sources of income for authors and publishers.82 Furthermore, the digital reproduction on
behalf of the participating libraries was considered as fair use. Google simply provided
the technical means to create digital  copies of analogue works already owned by the
public institutions encouraging lawful uses in accordance with copyright and in other
“transformative ways”, such as searchable indices of books or preservation.83
 
Comparison
43 The judgments point out different legal implications of importance in terms of digital
heritagization and illustrate the similar but distinct approaches of the two main legal
families  in  this  regard,  which  are  to  different  extents  able  to  keep  pace  with  the
technological developments and changed forms of use of copyrighted content.84
44 On the one hand, due to its broad formulation and its equitable character, the fair use/
fair dealing doctrine implemented in the common law jurisdictions can more easily adapt
to technological challenges as well as the needs of the information society and strongly
supports  processes  of  digital  heritagization.  In  this  respect,  there  seems  to  be  an
assumption  that  one  needs  to  prevent  copyright  law from becoming  an  obstacle  to
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cultural  developments  (Xalabarder,  2014:  56).  On  the  other  hand,  the  Continental
European approaches  rather  favor  authors’  rights  to the public  information interest.
Accordingly, the S.D.N.Y. rather unsurprisingly confirmed the admissibility of mass-scale
digitization projects  even by private  institutions  such as  Google,  which can serve as
incredible tools to advance progress in science and useful arts (Xalabarder, 2014: 56); the
Continental  European  courts,  arguing  on  a  technology-neutral  basis,  confirmed  the
permissibility of digitization processes to different extents, but refused more extensive
initiatives in this context, such as online archives; against the background of the current
interpretation of the “three-step test” findings comparable to those of the S.D.N.Y appear
rather unlikely for at least the near future (Xalabarder, 2014: 56 et seq).
45 Subsequently, the question arises whether there is a need to import the fair use doctrine
to Continental European jurisdictions and/or to provide for harmonization measures on
the European level.  Apart  from its  substantive advantages,  the implementation of  an
equitable “legal transplant”, originating from the dual system of common law into civil
law jurisdictions is a controversial issue in comparative legal research (Legrand, 1997: 111
et seq.; Örücü, 2002: 205 et seq). Though there have been considerations on the national
level to enhance copyrights flexibility by means of the fair use doctrine (Dnes, 2013: 439
et seq), the majority of experts rejects the introduction of such an exception.85 Reference
to general legal principles known to the civil law family could be a feasible alternative
and could serve comparable purposes. This should not obscure the fact that the American
doctrine also discusses partial reference to the continental European approach (Lessig,
2008: 267).
46 Besides, the previously indicated reciprocal relation of advantages and disadvantages of
the “fair use” and “closed list” tempt to stereotypically thinking in categories of black
and white (Rendas, 2015: 2 et seq, 9). Though, the codified legal exceptions appear to
provide a higher degree of legal certainty compared to the common law approach, the
ample  interpretation  of  these  norms  by  civil  law  courts,  trying  to  cope  with  new
technological  developments,  causes  again  legal  uncertainty  and  raises  questions
regarding  the  separation  of  powers.86 The  two  allegedly  distinct  systems  thereby
resemble each other, because it is finally for the judge to declare a certain behaviour as
(in)admissible.  Asking  which  approach  is  actually  more  suited  to  foster  the
transformation processes of digital heritagization, one could only respond: each in its
own way. However, a possible middle course to provide both flexibility and legal certainty
could be the reference to categories of uses instead of specific uses.87
 
Conclusions and Recommendations
47 Fair and balanced copyright, aiming at advancing the protection and dissemination of
cultural heritage in analogue as well  as digital  form, appears to be one of the major
challenges in the evolving information society (Kuhlen, 2013: 16). With regard to digital
heritagization, the court judgments previously discussed provide clarification of certain
aspects of digital reproduction and new forms of use, but several related issued remain
still unsettled. 
48 For example, the legal implications of orphan works constitute one of the pressing issues
in  this  regard,  which  remained  uncovered  by  the  aforementioned  judgments
notwithstanding  their  great  impact  for  mass-scale  digitization  projects.88 Heritage
institutions  “possess”  high  percentages  of  these  works  in  their  collections  and  any
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further attempt to extensively digitize copyrighted resources has to address this point
(Fischman Afori, 2013: 396). However, in the meantime, the European legislator became
active and issued Directive 2012/28/EU (“Orphan Works Directive”) which makes orphan
works available to the public and provides exceptions and limitations for the use of such
works in accordance with the InfoSoc Directive, particularly allowing reproduction for
purposes of digitization.89
49 The discourse on the legal implications of digital heritagization illustrates the increased
need for  a  comprehensive  global  or  at  least  regional  solution instead of  fragmented
optional  regimes  and  “national  silos”  of  copyright  legislation.90 In  this  regard,  the
academic initiative for the creation of a European Copyright Code is worth mentioning,
since it tries to carefully weigh public and private interests and provide legal exceptions
with  enhanced  flexibility  by  reference  to  a  mixture  of  common  law  and  civil  law
approaches (Kuhlen, 2013: 16). Of particular interest in this regard is the inclusion of
“further limitations” in Art. 5.5 European Copyright Code which would allow new forms
of use by analogy based upon the conditions set by the “three-step test”.91
50 Moreover, there seems to be a growing conviction on the political level that the European
copyright framework needs to be rethought in order to meet the challenges presented by
evolving digital markets and environments. According to MEP Julia Reda, rapporteur of
the draft  report on the evaluation of  the InfoSoc Directive published in early 201592,
copyright rules are not able to cope with the current needs of the information society and
complicate the fulfilment of public service obligations by institutions, such as libraries.
The technically outdated European legislation with transposition deviations among the
Member States constitutes an impediment to cross-border cultural exchange (Clay, 2015).
Besides the introduction of a single European Copyright Title that would directly and
uniformly  apply93,  the  draft  report  suggests  adapting  the  exceptions  and  limitations
contained in the InfoSoc Directive to the changed technical demands and, in addition,
render  them  uniformly  applicable  in  every  Member  State.94 Whether  there  are  less
invasive measures than legal unification and whether further competences need to be
conferred to the European level regarding the InfoSoc Directive can be left open herein,
since  considerations  on  regulatory  coherence  have  to  involve  the  whole  acquis
communitaire of European copyright law and should be embedded in the context of the
prospective  “Digital  Single  Market”,  which  would  widely  exceed  the  scope  of  this
contribution.95 
51 Following the limitation proposed in Art 5.5 European Copyright Code and the common
law model of fair use96, Reda proposed to have an open norm “introducing flexibility in
the interpretation of exceptions and limitations in certain special cases” in accordance
with the “three-step test” and hence seeking to break up the exhaustive list of exceptions
laid down in the InfoSoc Directive.97 The realization of such a norm would,  however,
amount to a paradigm change in European copyright law doctrine, which so far considers
the use of publicly available information and knowledge as an exception, but not as a
right in itself (Kuhlen, 2015).
52 Though  this  proposal  appears  to  be  controversial  at  first  sight,  the  new  digital
environment requires a certain adaption and rethinking in terms of copyright law. In the
context of digital heritagization, copyright law in its actual shape often interferes with
attempts to digitize and preserve the intellectual  and creative past  and presence for
future  generations  (Lessig,  2008:  261).  Thereby,  the  purpose  of  copyright  law is  not
constrained to the creation of private property rights, but it primarily seeks to foster
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cultural  and  intellectual  progress  of  public  interest  (Gillespie,  2007:  22).  In  order  to
balance all interests involved enhanced flexibility and the interpretation of personal use
in the sense of “public right” rather than something of exceptional character could help
to  reach  this  goal.  Furthermore,  this  perception  would  correspond  to  the  growing
expectations and needs for information in the digital society (Gladney, 2007 : 251).
53 The draft report gives new impetus to the debate on the modernization of copyright
legislation (Kuhlen, 2015), but whether the proposal set a new course, only the future can
tell. However, one has to consider that initiatives seeking to prevent drifting apart of law
and technology cannot be confined to the regulatory level or legal technicalities. Politics,
society  and  each  individual  equally  play  an  important  role  for  the  prospective
developments. Hence, the development of an understanding on the individual level for
both utilization of resources and cultural participation on the one hand and balancing of
public interests and creators’ rights on the other hand will form a decisive precondition
for the success of this endeavor. Thereby, the involvement of private actors which might
fulfill a gatekeeper function and thus support knowledge and information monopolies in
the context of digital heritagization will constitute an additional challenge in this regard. 
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ABSTRACTS
Due to the development of information and communication technologies as well as the influence
of the Internet, life and work of the contemporary society take increasingly place in virtual form
and the approach towards knowledge and heritage fundamentally altered. The remarkable sign
of this continuous process is the emergence of Digital Heritage, understood as the accumulation of
computer-based,  valuable  materials,  which  constitutes  a  digital  reflection  of  societal
developments.  Different  “heritage  institutions”  from  the  public  sector,  such  as  archives,
libraries,  museums,  but  also  private  undertakings  became involved in  the related process  of
Digital Heritagization encompassing cultural, scientific and administrative resources. The objective
aimed for is the preservation of the named resources in order to enable future generations to
access the collective memory of our society by means of electronic records. Since the digitization
of  analogue  resources  and  the  utilization  of  born-digital  content  presupposes  inter  alia the
reproduction and duplication of the content in question, the field of intellectual property law
gains  particular  interest.  Thereby,  the  discussion  on  the  national  and  international  level  is
characterized by the heterogeneous and partly  restrictive legal  framework.  The contribution
takes this new environment as opportunity to approach the legal framework of civil law as well
as common law jurisdictions related to digital heritage from a copyright law perspective, with
particular reference to the legal exemptions and fair dealings doctrine. In order to emphasize the
high  practical  impact  of  the  issue  at  stake,  recent  judgments  of  the  ECJ,  the  Swiss  Federal
Tribunal and the S.D.N.Y. (Google Books Case) assessing the admissibility of the digitalization and
related  aspects  are  considered  and  critically  evaluated.  On  that  basis,  the  future  need  of
legislative  measures  in  order  to  balance  personal  proprietary  rights  and  public  interests  is
discussed.
En raison du développement des technologies de l’information et de la communication et de
l’influence d’Internet, la vie et le travail de notre société contemporaine s’inscrit de plus en plus
dans des formes virtuelles et modifie fondamentalement le rapport au savoir et au patrimoine. Le
signe le plus notable de ce processus continu est l’émergence du patrimoine numérique, entendu
comme l’accumulation sur support informatique de matériel  considéré comme signifiant,  qui
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constitue  le  reflet  numérique  des  développements  sociétaux.  Différentes  institutions
patrimoniales du secteur public, comme le monde des archives, bibliothèques, musées mais aussi
des initiatives privées s’investissent dans le processus de patrimonialisation numérique qui y est
associé et englobe des ressources culturelles, scientifiques et administratives. L’enjeu sous-jacent
est la préservation de ces ressources afin de permettre aux générations futures d’accéder à la
mémoire  collective  de  nos  sociétés  par  le  biais  d’enregistrements  électroniques.  Puisque  la
numérisation  de  ressources  analogiques  et  l’utilisation  de  contenus  nativement  numériques
présuppose, entre autres, leur reproduction et duplication, le droit de propriété intellectuelle est
pertinent  dans  ce  contexte.  Par  ailleurs,  les  discussions  nationales  et  internationales  sont
caractérisées par un cadre juridique hétérogène et partiellement restrictif. Cet article considère
la  patrimonialisation  numérique  à  l’aune  du  régime  du  droit  d’auteur,  en  se  référant  tout
particulièrement aux exceptions légales et la doctrine de l’ « usage raisonnable ». Des jugements
récents émis par la Cour de justice européenne, le tribunal fédéral suisse et le tribunal du district
Sud de New York (le célèbre « Google Books Case »), portant sur l’admissibilité de la numérisation
et aspects corrélés, seront examinés. Sur cette base, l’article examine enfin les besoins futurs de
mesures législatives visant à équilibrer les droits de propriété personnels et l’intérêt public.
INDEX
Mots-clés: droit d’auteur, patrimoine numérique, cas « Google Books », propriété intellectuelle,
UNESCO
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